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Abstract 1 
Cumulative culture is rare, if not altogether absent in non-human species. At the foundation of 2 
cumulative learning is the ability to modify, relinquish or build upon prior behaviors flexibly to 3 
make them more productive or efficient. Within the primate literature, a failure to optimize 4 
solutions in this way is often proposed to derive from low-fidelity copying of witnessed 5 
behaviors, sub-optimal social learning heuristics, or a lack of relevant socio-cognitive 6 
adaptations. However, humans can also be markedly inflexible in their behaviors, perseverating 7 
with, or becoming fixated on outdated or inappropriate responses. Humans show differential 8 
patterns of flexibility as a function of cognitive load, exhibiting difficulties with inhibiting sub-9 
optimal behaviors when there are high demands on working memory. We present a series of 10 
studies on captive chimpanzees which indicate that behavioral conservatism in apes may be 11 
underlain by similar constraints: chimpanzees showed relatively little conservatism when 12 
behavioral optimization involved the inhibition of a well-established but simple solution, or the 13 
addition of a simple modification to a well-established but complex solution. In contrast, when 14 
behavioral optimization involved the inhibition of a well-established but complex solution, 15 
chimpanzees showed evidence of conservatism. We propose that conservatism is linked to 16 
behavioral complexity, potentially mediated by cognitive resource availability, and may be an 17 
important factor in the evolution of cumulative culture.  18 
Keywords: Behavioral flexibility, cumulative culture, chimpanzee, comparative psychology, 19 
learning, decision-making 20 
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Human culture is extraordinarily flexible in nature, exemplified by extensive 21 
diversification in technology and social practices. Behavioral flexibility forms not only the 22 
bedrock of this diversity but is a vital prerequisite for cumulative culture, affording the ability to 23 
build on established behaviors by modifying old solutions, and flexibly switching to more 24 
productive or efficient ones. Yet, our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, are reported to show 25 
difficulty in changing their solutions despite the availability of superior alternatives. This has 26 
been suggested to be an important explanation in that despite the existence of multiple–27 
tradition cultures that include an extensive diversity of forms of tool use, chimpanzees show 28 
minimal evidence at best of the cumulative evolution that that has shaped so much of human 29 
culture (Tennie, Call & Tomasello, 2009; Whiten, Hinde, Laland & Stranger, 2011; Whiten, 30 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009). Understanding the nature of behavioral 31 
conservatism, whereby prior knowledge appears to block or delay adoption of an alternative 32 
behavior (Lehner, Burkart, & Schaik, 2011; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008), may help 33 
explain the relatively static and limited scope of chimpanzee culture. In contrast, human 34 
cumulative culture is typified by modifications to existing, and often complex sequences of 35 
behavior that underwrite our technologies, languages and social customs. 36 
1.1 Cognitive accounts of behavioral inflexibility in humans 37 
Given the adaptive advantage of behavioral flexibility in solution optimization 38 
(convergence on the most productive or efficient behaviors), why would any species exhibit 39 
highly conservative tendencies? Strikingly though, inflexibility in action or thought is well 40 
documented in human children (e.g. Defeyter & German, 2003;  Kirkham et al., 2003; Zelazo 41 
et al., 2003), as well as in human adults (e.g. Bilalić et al., 2008a, b; Chrysikou et al., 2013; 42 
Diamond, 2005; German & Barrett, 2005; Gopnik et al., 2015; Luchins, 1942; Pope et al., 43 
2015; Wiley, 1998). Within this human literature, the phenomenon is more often referred to 44 
in relation to concepts of perseveration, functional fixedness or mental set (aka Einstellung).  45 
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We suggest that perseveration analyzed in the human literature, and behavioral 46 
conservatism described in the non-human primate literature, exhibit parallels: both involve the 47 
continued use of outdated responses despite knowledge of a more appropriate alternative. In 48 
contrast, functional fixedness, or mental set, tends to be more closely linked with (lack of) 49 
innovation, creative thinking, or insight, specifically getting ‘stuck’ on the common usage of a 50 
tool or behavior pattern, blocking solutions which would otherwise be easily generated 51 
(Defeyter & German, 2003), a blockage overcome once knowledge of an alternative becomes 52 
available.  53 
Perseveration  54 
Perseveration in children is linked to the development of executive functions: “a set of 55 
general-purpose control mechanisms … that regulate the dynamics of human cognition and 56 
action” (Miyake & Friedman, 2012, pg 2). While there is some disagreement concerning the 57 
nature of executive functions, commonly identified components include inhibition (overriding 58 
“a strong internal disposition”), working memory (“holding information in mind and mentally 59 
working with it”) and switching/shifting (“changing perspectives or approaches to a problem”) 60 
(Diamond 2013, pg137). Allocation of resources to executive functions comes increasingly 61 
under control with age (Best & Miller, 2010; Braet et al., 2009; Thompson-schill, Ramscar, & 62 
Chrysikou, 2009), with maturation linked to both increases in working memory capacity and 63 
inhibitory control (Diamond & Doar, 1989). 64 
From the executive function perspective, we expect the likelihood of perseveration to 65 
be affected by two mechanisms: (i) response prepotency, and (ii) working memory load  66 
(Grandjean & Collette, 2011; Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994; Roberts & Pennington, 1996). (i) 67 
Extensive practice with behavior may cause it to become a predominant or prepotent response 68 
(Miller, 2000), making it difficult to subsequently relinquish through inhibitory processes. (ii) 69 
Increased taxation or load on working memory, associated with complex behavior, affects the 70 
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ability to adopt solutions (Beilock & Decaro, 2007; See also Gathercole et al., 2008). Crucially, 71 
not only might these two factors affect the likelihood of perseveration, but may share cognitive 72 
resources i.e. draw from the same finite pool of the brain’s computational power (Barber, 73 
Caffo, Pekar & Mostofsky, 2013; Bunge, Ochsner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001; 74 
Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Hester, Murphy, & Garavan, 2004; McNab et al., 75 
2008; Mostofsky et al., 2003). For example, increased load on working memory is associated 76 
with greater difficulties in successfully inhibiting behaviors and adopting alternatives (Berger, 77 
2004, 2010; Chmielewski, Mückschel, Stock, & Beste, 2015; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 78 
2001; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Grandjean & Collette, 2011; Hester & 79 
Garavan, 2005; Roberts et al., 1994; Stedron, Sahni, & Munakata, 2005; see also Kane & 80 
Engle, 2003; Marton, Kelmenson, & Pinkhasova, 2008; Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011). 81 
These studies indicate that the more prepotent and complex an existing response, the greater 82 
the difficulty in relinquishing this response and adopting another (Houghton and Tipper, 1994; 83 
Munakata, 2001). Importantly, this research strongly suggests that behavioral conservatism is a 84 
function of cognitive resource availability: perseveration is underlain by limited cognitive 85 
resources in key executive functions, with high demands on working memory likely detracting 86 
from the resources needed for inhibition.   87 
A cognitive account of behavioral inflexibility in chimpanzees 88 
Behavioral conservatism in primates is typically ascribed to some limitation in their social 89 
learning capabilities, such as low-fidelity copying (Lewis & Laland, 2012), or lack of relevant 90 
socio-cognitive adaptations (Tomasello, Carpenter, & Hobson, 2005); however, the present 91 
study of the context of behavioral flexibility in chimpanzees leads us to contend that 92 
chimpanzees display behavioral conservatism under the same conditions that cause 93 
perseveration in humans. We re-examine behavioral conservatism through a cognitive lens (see 94 
also Gruber, 2016; Gruber, Zuberbuhler, Clement & van Schaik, 2015) by drawing from the 95 
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human literature to advance a relatively unexplored cognitive account of why we observe 96 
behavioral inflexibility in our close primate cousins. We propose that this new and 97 
complementary way of thinking about behavioral conservatism helps explain the mixed findings 98 
within the primate literature, and additionally, offers important insights into the relatively static 99 
nature of chimpanzee culture. 100 
Behavioral conservatism in chimpanzees 101 
There is no unitary concept of what makes one behavior complex and another simple, 102 
but we propose two metrics for which we might reasonably assume complexity. The first 103 
concerns the learning of new behavioral processes; individuals familiar with simple mechanics, 104 
such as levers, or sliding doors, do not need to relearn how to pull or slide when confronted 105 
with novel problems requiring these responses. They must only learn the particular affordances 106 
of the new problem and then apply known behaviors (Byrne & Russon, 1998). In contrast, 107 
solutions which require novel action elements must be learnt through some form of process 108 
learning. Therefore, in these studies, we class simple behaviors as those which are already well 109 
within the capabilities of the participants, and easily discovered by novices. Second, we might 110 
assume behaviors which require holding in memory several relations between objects, such as 111 
solutions involving multiple, non-arbitrary steps, are more complex than solutions which 112 
require fewer steps, with the former placing higher demands on cognitive resources (Halford, 113 
Wilson, & Phillips, 1998). As such, we consider these solutions, which are not easily adopted 114 
by novices, and which require relatively long periods of learning before mastery, as complex.  115 
 When solutions involve simple behaviors, chimpanzees have been found to modify 116 
well-established behaviors to improve productivity and efficiency. For example, Hopper et al. 117 
(2015), van Leeuwen, Cronin and Schutte (2013) and Vale et al (2017) found that chimpanzees 118 
in token deposit and token exchange tasks flexibly switched between solutions to maximize 119 
payoff. However, the initial solution (Solution A) in these studies, and the new, more 120 
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productive alternative solution (Solution B) were not only relatively simple behaviors but 121 
conceptually very similar to one another - B involved the same behaviors as A, with the 122 
exception of changing the type of token exchanged or the location the token was deposited. 123 
These behaviors likely place low cognitive demands on participants (see also Manrique, Volter 124 
& Call, 2013). Relatedly, when Solution A is not prepotent, there is also evidence that 125 
chimpanzees will quickly relinquish solution A for B. For example, Horner and Whiten (2005) 126 
first demonstrated a complex Solution A to young chimpanzees, who upon discovering the 127 
redundancy of some elements of A, modified it to display a simpler, more efficient variant (B). 128 
However, chimpanzees practiced A only three times before using B, so A was not a well-129 
established solution (see also Yamamoto, Humle & Tanaka, 2013). In contrast, chimpanzees 130 
show difficulties in adopting, relinquishing or building upon behaviors when higher levels of 131 
solution complexity are involved and the initial solution is well-established. For example, Davis, 132 
Vale, Schapiro, Lambeth and Whiten (2016), Hrubesch, Preuschoft and van Schaik (2009), 133 
and Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) found that under these conditions, chimpanzees 134 
failed to change, build upon or fully relinquish Solution A in order to adopt a more optimal 135 
Solution B, despite B being within their behavioral repertoires. Thus, when Solution A is both 136 
complex and prepotent, chimpanzees appear to display high levels of perseveration with 137 
Solution A.  138 
Given these findings, we propose that chimpanzee behavioral flexibility may be context 139 
dependent, with factors such as response prepotency and complexity of behavior affecting the 140 
likelihood of behavioral change, and thence behavior optimization. While executive function 141 
processes and problem solving capabilities have been examined in captive chimpanzees (Amici, 142 
Aureli & Call, 2008; Beran, Washburn, & Rumbaugh, 2007; Evans, Perdue, & Beran, 2014; 143 
Manrique & Call, 2015; Seed, Call, Emery, & Clayton, 2009; see also Seed, Seddon, Greene, & 144 
Call, 2012; Vlamings, Hare, & Call, 2009), to our knowledge, we are the first to propose this 145 
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executive function framework of behavioral conservatism in chimpanzees, and to provide direct 146 
evidence below in support of this new, cognitive based account of context dependent flexibility. 147 
The present study 148 
To explore the hypothesis that chimpanzee behavioral conservatism may be underlain by 149 
cognitive constraints similar to those demonstrated in human research, we presented captive 150 
chimpanzees with solution optimization puzzles. We trained captive chimpanzees to adopt sub-151 
optimal techniques. Solution optimization required inhibiting these techniques to adopt a more 152 
productive alternative. One puzzlebox (the ‘Biways box’) involved only simple behaviors, 153 
whereas a second (‘Pitfall box’) involved a mixture of complex and simple solutions. We 154 
assumed that complex behaviors would be associated with a higher cognitive load, and thus 155 
expected chimpanzees to show greater difficulties with inhibition in that case.  156 
With a focus on the effects of solution complexity on behavioral flexibility, we aimed to 157 
answer the following questions: 158 
I. Study 1.1. Biways box: Will chimpanzees inhibit an established but simple solution and 159 
switch to a simple alternative to increase reward pay-off?  160 
II. Study 1.2. Biways box: Does having an established but simple solution hinder adoption 161 
of the simple, more productive alternative? 162 
III. Study 2.1. Pitfall box: Does having an established but complex solution (Solution A) 163 
hinder adoption of a more complex, more productive solution (Solution B) when 164 
inhibition of A is not required 165 
IV. Study 2.2. Pitfall box: Does having an established but complex solution (Solution A) 166 
hinder adoption of a simple, more productive alternative (Solution C) when inhibition 167 
of A is required? 168 
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Study 1.1 Biways box: Will chimpanzees inhibit an established but simple 169 
solution and switch to a simple alternative to increase reward pay-off? 170 
Rewards in the Biways box could be attained via the operation of one of two handles 171 
distinguished by both location and coloring, as well as the action required to operate them 172 
(Figure 1). Operating the top handle (slide handle) delivered one peanut (Supplementary video 173 
1), whereas the bottom handle (pull handle) delivered a higher value payoff, the peanut plus 2-174 
3 grapes, the latter being a highly valued food reward for chimpanzees (Supplementary video 175 
2). Both methods were single-stepped and well within the participant’s repertoires. Accordingly, 176 
we class these as relatively ‘simple solutions’: they do not require learning new behavioral 177 
processes or holding multiple relations in mind.  178 
Insert Figure 1 about here 179 
Chimpanzees across five groups first learned the slide solution. In three of these 180 
groups, a conspecific group member (the model) then demonstrated the more productive pull 181 
technique (increased payoff with social information – IPSI – groups). To determine if 182 
behavioral change within IPSI groups was motivated by payoff, in the remaining two groups, a 183 
model also introduced the pull technique, but this pull solution produced the same reward as 184 
the slide solution (i.e. there was no payoff incentive to change to this new technique – same 185 
payoff with social information – SI - groups).  186 
Given the importance of social learning for the propagation, maintenance, and 187 
accumulation of culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Legare & Nielsen, 2015), we examined the 188 
effects of social information on behavioral optimization through the inclusion of an asocial 189 
control condition. Here, individuals experienced the same puzzlebox configuration as the IPSI 190 
group, but no social information was available regarding the more productive pull technique 191 
(increased payoff but no social information - IP - individuals). Group conditions are 192 
summarized in Table 1. 193 
 12 
Insert Table 1 about here 194 
Methods 195 
Participants 196 
Twenty-eight chimpanzees participated (9 males; average age: 31.7 years; range: 13.09 – 197 
50.39) and were group housed at the National Center for Chimpanzee Care at the Michale E. 198 
Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research of The University of Texas MD 199 
Anderson Cancer Center in Bastrop, Texas, U.S.A. See Supplementary Materials Table S1 for 200 
further participant details.  201 
Apparatus 202 
The Biways box, originally designed for a comparative social learning study (Wood, 203 
Kendal, & Flynn, 2013), was re-purposed by SJD for the current study. No participant had 204 
previous experience with this box. Additionally, the Biways box was significantly modified from 205 
its original form, both in appearance and function. It was transparent with the two handles 206 
protruding from the front. When the slide handle was slid to the right, it knocked a peanut off 207 
a shelf inside the apparatus, and down a chute, where it could be retrieved by the participant. 208 
Alternatively, the pull handle could be used to displace the entire shelf so that all of the greater 209 
reward (nut + grapes) fell down the chute. The reward on the shelf was always visible to the 210 
participant. 211 
Training phase 212 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) groups. 25 individuals across three 213 
groups were given five hours of opportunity to train, where an already-trained, mid-high 214 
ranking, female conspecific demonstrated the slide solution to produce one peanut within her 215 
group. Of these 25 individuals, eight met criterion for inclusion (range of 2-3 individuals per 216 
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group). The pull handle was locked so that it was immovable (thus making the grapes 217 
unobtainable).  Participants were considered to have established the slide technique when they 218 
slid the handle fifty times over three separate training sessions, with no more than two touches 219 
to the pull handle (with the count reset at every third touch). Such a strict criterion ensured that 220 
not only was the slide solution a well-established response, but that any pull responses in 221 
subsequent testing were unlikely to be spurious, or ‘accidental’. If an individual showed interest 222 
in participating but was unable to complete training to criterion within the five hours, they were 223 
offered the opportunity to voluntarily enter their indoor enclosures and separate for further 224 
training. Due to the high inclusion criterion, further training was required for all but one 225 
individual.  226 
Same payoff with social information (SI) group. Training with two groups (total of 13 227 
individuals with N=6 meeting criterion for inclusion) followed that outlined above, with the 228 
exception that the Biways box was baited with only one peanut.  229 
Increased payoff but no social information (IP) group. Five individuals were offered the 230 
opportunity to separate for training with a human demonstrator, with the criterion for inclusion 231 
as outlined above. The box was baited with one peanut and three grapes, but only the peanut 232 
could be retrieved via sliding the handle. The pull handle was locked shut. Human 233 
demonstrations of the slide technique were given. 234 
Testing phase 235 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) group. The pull handle was unlocked. 236 
Following model retraining, over ten hours of testing, the model now demonstrated the pull 237 
solution. All participants observed the model before participation, and could participate 238 
throughout this testing phase (Table S5). Participants could thus solve the Biways box by sliding 239 
the slide handle (for one peanut) or could switch to pulling the more productive pull handle. 240 
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When the participant removed the reward from the chute, the apparatus was immediately 241 
pulled away, reset and rebaited.  242 
Same payoff with social information (SI) groups. Testing followed the procedure above, 243 
with the exception that the pull handle resulted in the same reward as the slide handle (one 244 
peanut). 245 
Increased payoff but no social information (IP) group. Testing was terminated after 246 
participants had completed 115 solutions. This termination point was more than 100 beyond 247 
the average number taken before switching in the IPSI group (median = 13.5), and exceeded 248 
the maximum number taken by any IPSI individual before switching to the pull handle (range 249 
of 1-114; Table 2). 250 
Coding and analyses 251 
Training and testing phases were narrated and visually recorded using a HC-920 252 
Panasonic camcorder, with responses coded through video analysis. A slide or pull behavior 253 
was coded when a participant manipulated only the slide or pull handle respectively.  254 
Manipulation of both handles was coded as ‘both’. Convergence on the pull handle occurred 255 
when an individual used the pull technique on three consecutive occasions. Reversions were 256 
using the slide handle or both handles once a participant had switched to the pull technique.  257 
Data were analyzed using Bayesian methods generated by the ‘rethinking’ package in R 258 
(McElreath, 2016), which was used for analyses throughout the studies reported. 259 
Supplementary Material describes the analyses in detail, and reports the results of alternative 260 
methods of statistical analyses, including a frequentist approach. Throughout analyses, a 95% 261 
confidence (or credible) interval is reported. This is the interval between which 95% of 262 
plausible values lie. The average value reported is the most probable of all these. Predictions 263 
generated by modelling procedures are also reported. These predictions are based on the 264 
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sample data and attempt to capture population level behaviors. Deviation of the outcome of 265 
these predictions from the sample data are reported in the Supplementary Material. Model 266 
comparison techniques are also used to construct and choose between different models of the 267 
data. This involves inputting different combinations of parameters and seeing how well each 268 
predict the data in comparison to one another. We report here on the models which carry 269 
most of the Akaike weight (i.e. best predict the data). The model was fitted as the proportion of 270 
pull solutions out of the total number of responses (pull, slide and both), as predicted by the 271 
absence or presence of social information and increased payoff. 272 
Results 273 
Participant inclusion  274 
Eight individuals in the IPSI groups met criterion for inclusion, six in the SI groups and 275 
five in the IP group.  276 
Solutions used 277 
In the IPSI groups, all chimpanzees switched to using pull on the median 14th solution 278 
attempt (range 1-114). During the transition of switching, individuals used both handles per 279 
solution a median of two times (range 0-9). There was little to no reversion to the original slide 280 
method, with only two individuals ever using the slide handle after switching (Cr used the slide 281 
method once in his subsequent 81 solutions, and Cea on three of her 84). Use of both handles 282 
per solution was rare post-switch (median = 2.4% of total post switch solutions, range = 0 - 4.8).  283 
In the SI groups, where the pull handle resulted in the same reward as the slide, four of the six 284 
individuals never manipulated the pull handle. Chu used the pull handle once on her first trial. 285 
Ga used both the pull handle and the slide handle, but with a preference for his original slide 286 
technique (sliding in 199/328 solutions). In the IP group, who had not witnessed a model 287 
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perform the more productive pull solution, no individual discovered it. Testing data are 288 
summarized in the Table 2. 289 
Insert Table 2 about here 290 
Regression models 291 
The model that best described the relationship between predictors and outcome was 292 
Pull Total  Binomial (Total solutions, p) 293 
Logit(p)  a + a[Individual]+bip*IP+bsi*SI + bipsi*IP*SI, 294 
In the full model above, a is the value of the average intercept, a [individual] is the intercept 295 
deviance for each participant (allowing partially pooled variance), bip is the value of the 296 
coefficient of the effect of Increased Payoff, bsi is the value of the coefficient of the effect of the 297 
presence of Social Information, and bipsi is the value of the coefficient of the interaction 298 
between the presence of a solution with an Increased Payoff (IP) and the presence of Social 299 
Information (SI) regarding the availability of an alternative solution. Coefficients are 300 
summarized in Table 3, and indicate no credible effect of either main effect. In support of this 301 
conclusion, models which did not include the main effects, that is, just the interaction effect, 302 
gained 39% of the Akaike weight, indicating that solution choice of Pull is largely affected by 303 
the interaction effect. However, as the full model gained most of the Akaike weight (61%), we 304 
summarize the expected proportion of pull solutions for each condition in Figure 2, with only 305 
IPSI groups predicted to use the pull solution. In sum, results indicate a clear interaction effect 306 
of increased payoff and social information, with no important main effects of either factor 307 
alone. Additional details of the analyses and results can be found in the supplementary 308 
materials (pages 2-6) 309 
Insert Table 3 about here  310 
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Insert Figure 2 about here 311 
Discussion of Study 1.1 312 
IPSI chimpanzees relinquished a highly established, but simple foraging behavior in 313 
favor of an alternative, simple solution. Behavioral optimization required both a payoff 314 
incentive (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014) and social information of the more productive 315 
alternative (summarized in Figure 2). However, although there is a strong effect of social 316 
information, the lack of discovery in the asocial controls (IP individuals) is not likely due to an 317 
inability to perform the pull technique: participants likely just did not realize (and did not 318 
explore to discover) that the pull handle was an available solution. This suggests that having a 319 
highly practiced working solution may hinder exploration of alternatives (cf Bonawitz et al., 320 
2011; Wood et al., 2013). However, when social information is available, this may be 321 
capitalized upon to encourage exploratory behavior, and more productive solutions thus 322 
subsequently acquired (Montague, King-Casas, & Cohen, 2006; Toelch, Bruce, Meeus, & 323 
Reader, 2011).  324 
Most chimpanzees used both handles during the transition of switching to the pull 325 
technique. This may be a result of trial and error learning, or of some failure to completely 326 
inhibit use of the slide handle in the first instances of using the pull technique. Although 327 
reversion to using the slide handle was rare, participants occasionally employed use of both 328 
handles post-switch. The use of both handles during transition and reversions draws parallels 329 
with suggestions that children, when learning new problem-solving strategies, have competing 330 
representations of these strategies, which overlap and compete not only during periods of 331 
transition, but over extended periods of time (Siegler, 1996). 332 
While participants showed a ready ability to change their method of solution, it 333 
remained to be determined if having a well-established but simple prior solution hindered 334 
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behavioral optimization in IPSI individuals through delaying convergence on the pull 335 
technique.  336 
Study 1.2. Biways box: Does having an established but simple solution hinder 337 
adoption of the simple, more productive alternative? 338 
In study 1.2, the numbers of solutions performed before converging on the more productive 339 
pull technique were compared between the IPSI individuals of study 1.1 and new, solution 340 
naïve participants: chimpanzees who had no prior, sub-optimal, solution to the Biways box. 341 
Methods 342 
Testing phase 343 
Increased payoff but solution naïve (SN) groups. The box was presented to two groups, 344 
in which nine individuals altogether participated, with both the slide and pull solutions open to 345 
discovery, with the slide technique resulting in one peanut, and the pull producing one peanut 346 
plus 2-3 grapes. A high-ranking model trained on the pull technique was present in each group. 347 
As we were interested in how having a prior solution affected behavioral optimization, testing 348 
for SN groups was terminated once participants had converged on the pull technique (pulling 349 
on three consecutive occasions), with convergence seen as optimization.  350 
Analysis 351 
 The number of attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution was compared 352 
between IPSI participants in Study 1.1 and SN individuals using a log-linear regression model 353 
to model the effect of experience.  354 
Results and discussion of Study 1.2 355 
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             Experienced individuals (IPSI) took a median of 13.5 (range 1-114) solutions to 356 
optimize their behaviour by using the pull solution; naïve individuals took a median of only 1 357 
(range 1-43). Analysis revealed that the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval of the effect 358 
of experience with a prior, alternative solution was close to zero (coefficient mean of 5.5, 95% 359 
confidence interval of 1.9 to 16.1). Although Naïve individuals were predicted to converge on 360 
the pull behavior a median of 10 solutions earlier (95% confidence interval 1-29), model 361 
comparison suggests having a prior solution may not have had a credible effect, as models with 362 
and without prior solution as a variable were given similar weight, (Akaike weight of 0.58 and 363 
0.42 respectively) i.e. describe the data almost equally as well (Table S7). This indicates a 364 
potentially weak effect of having a prior solution. Alternative analyses (frequentist and Bayesian 365 
estimation) were run and do not support an effect of prior experience. This indicates that 366 
having a well-established, but simple solution may nevertheless not have a strong impact on 367 
behavioral conservatism, or perseveration, with a well-known, but sub-optimal foraging 368 
behavior.  See Supplementary Material pages 6-9 for further analyses and results. 369 
To further examine the causes of behavioral conservatism, the complexity of the initial 370 
solution was increased in study 2. 371 
Study 2.1. Pitfall box: Does having an established but complex solution 372 
(Solution A) hinder adoption of a more complex solution (Solution B), when 373 
inhibition of A is not required 374 
As perseveration within the human literature is linked to cognitive load and solution 375 
complexity, chimpanzees were trained to extract a small reward from the Pitfall box described 376 
below, using a complex solution. A mid-high ranking, female conspecific introduced a simple 377 
addition to the solution, which improved productivity. Behavior was subsequently investigated 378 
over ten hours of testing. Unlike the Biways box, this solution involved a multi-stepped 379 
 20 
procedure, and was not one that could be readily discovered. In particular, chimpanzees 380 
showed difficulties in the learning of one novel action involving the removal of a defense block. 381 
Due to the incorporation of this novel element, and the multiple, non-arbitrary steps required, 382 
we propose that the initial solution for the Pitfall box was more complex than that needed for 383 
the Biways box.  384 
Methods 385 
Participants 386 
 Participants were group housed at the National Center for Chimpanzee Care (N=24, 10 387 
males, mean =31.9 years, range: 19.8 – 50.9; demographics in Table S8). 388 
Apparatus 389 
A transparent foodbox (Figure 3) was structured on two levels, with a small reward on 390 
the top level (half a peanut) and a larger reward on the bottom (two peanuts). This was placed 391 
in the center of a large, transparent apparatus (Pitfall box; Figure 3– only the right side of the 392 
apparatus was used in these studies). This foodbox could be progressed along the Pitfall box 393 
using fingers via an open access slot on the front (from the chimpanzee’s perspective). Three 394 
doors were located on the front of the apparatus (only Doors 1 and 2 were relevant to these 395 
studies), which could be opened to gain access to the reward within the foodbox. To progress 396 
the foodbox to Door 1, a block defense had to be pushed out of the foodbox’s path. A pit (or 397 
trap) was located between this block and Door 1, which could be opened or closed by the 398 
experimenter. 399 
Insert Figure 3 about here 400 
Training phase  401 
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Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) groups. 23 individuals across four 402 
groups were given the opportunity to participate. Of these individuals, 10 met criterion for 403 
inclusion (range of 2-3 individuals per group). Chimpanzees were trained to solve the task using 404 
a ‘No Door Solution’ by ferrying the foodbox to Door 1, removing the block defense along the 405 
way. At Door 1, the participant could reach in via a small access point cut into the door and 406 
take the small reward from the top shelf of the foodbox. The large reward was in view, but was 407 
inaccessible as all doors were locked shut. Further, the roof of the pit was closed over, and so 408 
all food reward passed safely over the pit without falling into it (Figure 4). Participants had to 409 
perform this solution 20 times to meet inclusion criterion.  410 
Insert Figure 4 about here 411 
 Initially, the designated model within each group displayed this complex method over 412 
one hour of training; however, it became apparent that chimpanzees were finding it difficult to 413 
learn this solution, and in particular, the removal of the block defense. Removal required a 414 
hard ‘poke’ to the block, which caused it to shoot out the back of the apparatus. Many failed to 415 
perform this action, instead repeatedly pushing the foodbox against the block to no effect. To 416 
help solution acquisition, participants were given the opportunity to separate voluntarily for 417 
further human demonstrations and scaffolding of the solution (this was required for all but one 418 
participant). No verbal praise or reward was given for any part of the solution, other than the 419 
final retrieval of reward from the foodbox at Door 1. This ensured that particular elements of 420 
the solution were not themselves associated with some reward.  421 
Once an individual had extracted the small reward, the apparatus was left against the 422 
mesh for a further 5 seconds. This extended time meant that there was opportunity to explore 423 
the apparatus in training, thus reducing spurious exploration in subsequent testing sessions 424 
Increased payoff with no social information (IP) group (N=6). To examine the effect of 425 
social information on behavioral change, six individuals were offered the opportunity to 426 
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separate voluntarily for training on the No Door Solution, following the procedures above. If 427 
an individual did not wish to separate, that individual was trained in the presence of other 428 
group members, providing there was no interference by those individuals.  429 
Testing phase  430 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) group (N=10). Door 1 was unlocked. 431 
The model performed a new, more productive solution (Door 1 Solution) in her group over 432 
ten hours of testing and open diffusion. All participants observed the model before performing 433 
any solution (Table S11) and were free to participate throughout the testing period. This 434 
solution involved using the No Door Solution with the addition of pushing Door 1 upwards, 435 
giving access to the previously inaccessible large reward (Supplementary Video 3; Figure 5). 436 
Once the participant extracted any part of the reward, the apparatus was left against the mesh 437 
for 5 seconds, allowing further exploration and ensuring that failure to use Door 1 was not due 438 
to a lack of opportunity.  439 
Insert Figure 5 about here 440 
Increased payoff but no social information (IP) groups (N=5). Individuals were offered 441 
the opportunity to separate for testing. Door 1 was unlocked, and individuals were given up to 442 
one hour (over 20 minute sessions) to discover Door 1.  443 
Analysis 444 
 To investigte the effect of social information on behavioral optimization, the number of 445 
attempts taken to converge on the optimum solution was compared between IPSI individuals 446 
and IP individuals, using a log-linear regression model. Further details on this model and 447 
addtitional analyses using Bayesian estimation and frequentist methods are reported in the 448 
Supplementary Material.  449 
Results 450 
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Participant inclusion  451 
Ten individuals in the IPSI groups met criterion for inclusion, and six in the IP groups. 452 
All chimpanzees in the IPSI groups quickly built on their behavior to improve productivity, 453 
doing so on their 3
rd
 trial (median; range 1-24). Reversions to the trained solution (No Door 454 
Solution) were rare (median 0, range 0-2). Five participants in the IP groups (asocial controls) 455 
discovered Door 1 (median trials to discovery = 18.5, range 5-84).  456 
Regression model: effect of social information 457 
It was found that social information facilitated acquisition of the more productive solution by 458 
reducing the number of trials taken to converge on the Door 1 Solution (expected median of 459 
12 trials earlier, 95% confidence interval of 3-33 trials earlier), with a model including social 460 
information as a variable affecting optimization carrying almost all of the Akaike weight (96%), 461 
thus describing the data better than a model without an effect of social information (see 462 
Supplementary Material pages 10-13 for further analyses and results) 463 
General flexibility 464 
Chimpanzees employed variants of the same solution throughout testing, changing the 465 
order of the actions required for solution (Table 4).  Participants also pre-emptively removed 466 
defenses (the block and Door 1 - median of 8 number of pre-emptive moves, range 6-51).  467 
Discussion of Study 2.1 468 
Here, we tested if chimpanzees would show behavioral conservatism when adding a 469 
simple addition to a complex solution. That the original No Door Solution was complex in 470 
nature is supported by the difficulty chimpanzees had in learning it during the training phase. 471 
Overall, little evidence of behavioral conservatism was seen on this task. Not only did 472 
chimpanzees in the IPSI groups readily build on their complex solution, but employed 473 
multiple variants of the same solution (Table 4), and often pre-emptively removed defenses to 474 
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reward procurement. The accumulation witnessed here was very simple, involving a 475 
modification that was well within the behavioral repertoire of these chimpanzees, as 476 
demonstrated by asocial controls who also built on their solutions through individual discovery 477 
of Door 1. Social information facilitated acquisition of the more productive solution but was 478 
not required for acquisition.  479 
One reason for the lack of conservatism seen here may be the simplicity of the 480 
modification (i.e. lifting a door); that is, knowing a complex behavior may not result in 481 
behavioral conservatism when modification to solutions are simple and do not require learning 482 
of new behavioral processes. Another reason may be that chimpanzees were not required to 483 
inhibit a complex solution, as the Door 1 solution incorporated all elements of the No Door 484 
Solution.  Human cognitive research has suggested that complex behaviors place a higher load 485 
on working memory, which interacts with inhibition processes (Diamond, 2013), potentially 486 
through ‘using up’ shared cognitive resources which may be required for successful inhibition. 487 
This results in perseverance with an outdated solution. 488 
Study 2.2. Pitfall box: Does having an established but complex solution 489 
(Solution A) hinder adoption of a simple, more productive alternative (Solution 490 
B), when inhibition of A is required? 491 
To examine potential causes of behavioral conservatism further, and the interaction 492 
between solution complexity and inhibition, the apparatus was modified so that the pit was 493 
opened. This caused the large reward (but not the small one) to fall into the trap if the foodbox 494 
was moved over this (Supplementary Video 4), as in the original No Door Solution and now 495 
extensively practiced Door 1 Solution. Door 2 was unlocked and could now be opened to 496 
retrieve all rewards. Hence, individuals in the IPSI groups could perseverate with their old 497 
solution, which would result in a small reward, or they could inhibit their behaviors by not 498 
moving the foodbox over the pit, and instead open Door 2 for all rewards (Supplementary 499 
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Video 5). Door 2 was nearly identical to Door 1, which all participants had mastered in the 500 
previous testing session (Study 2.1: median of 59 lifts, range 23-102).  501 
The effect of social information on convergence on the Door 2 solution, and thus 502 
inhibition, was not examined here. The IPSI groups had ten hours of prior experience using 503 
the complex solution (No Door and Door 1 Solutions), which was not possible with asocial 504 
controls, introducing a confound between the effect of social information and experience with 505 
the solution. We compared number of solutions taken by IPSI individuals against solution 506 
naïve chimpanzees (i.e. those with no prior knowledge of a sub-optimal solution) to converge 507 
on the Door 2 Solution (evaluating the effect of prior solution on optimization). We also 508 
considered the number of solutions taken to converge on the Door 1 Solution in Study 2.1 509 
compared to the Door 2 Solution here within IPSI individuals (recording ease of incorporation 510 
of a simple modification to a solution when optimization requires building on, versus the 511 
inhibition of, a known solution). 512 
Methods 513 
Testing phase 514 
Increased payoff with social information (IPSI) groups. The Door 2 Solution was 515 
displayed by the model during ten hours of testing and open diffusion (Figure 6). All 516 
participants observed the model before performing any solution. Convergence on the Door 2 517 
Solution was taken as three consecutive Door 2 Solutions, with little or no later use of 518 
alternative solutions. 519 
Insert Figure 6 about here 520 
Solution naïve (SN) group (Two groups, N= 8). While social information is unlikely to 521 
be necessary for solution acquisition, to rule out the confound of the presence/absence of 522 
social information and analyse our data based on the presence/absence of prior experience, 523 
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two mid-high ranking, female conspecifics were trained to display the Door 2 Solution to their 524 
groups. Due to time constraints and monopolization of the apparatus by dominant individuals, 525 
groups had a 15-minute group-interaction period with the apparatus before interested 526 
participants were offered the opportunity to separate voluntarily (either on their own, or in 527 
small groups) until they converged on the Door 2 Solution. 528 
Analysis 529 
To examine the effect of having a prior solution on behavior optimization, log-linear 530 
regression models compared the number of attempts taken to converge on the Door 2 Solution 531 
between IPSI and SN groups, as well as between the number of solutions taken by IPSI 532 
individuals to converge on the Door 1 and Door 2 Solutions (i.e. within subjects comparison, 533 
with random effects considered).  534 
Results 535 
Solutions used 536 
IPSI participants used their old solution a median of 29.5 times (range 3 - 105) before 537 
switching to use the Door 2 Solution, which they then performed a median of 51 times (range 0 538 
- 90). Solution naïve individuals used only the Door 2 Solution, apart from individual Kg who 539 
used the No Door Solution once, before discovering the Door 2 Solution. 540 
Reversions and redundant behaviors in IPSI individuals 541 
The redundant lifting of Door 1, or removing the block when reward had already been 542 
extracted, were uncommon (median of 6 redundant actions, range 0-26). Reversions were also 543 
rare (median 4.5, range 0-8).  544 
Regression model: Effect of prior solution 545 
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All IPSI chimpanzees, except individual Ci, converged on the optimum solution 546 
(median 28th solution, range 4 - 99), and naïve individuals on their median 1st solution (range 547 
1-2). 548 
Prior behavior credibly delayed adoption of the optimum behavior (regression 549 
coefficient of 11.8, 95% confidence interval of 6.5 - 21.5), with naïve individuals expected to 550 
take 14 fewer solution attempts (median, 95% confidence interval 8-24 fewer attempts; model 551 
predictions are presented in Figure 7). Model comparison gave all the Akaike weight to a 552 
model which included an effect of prior solution i.e. a model without prior solution as a factor 553 
does not adequately describe the data.  554 
Further details on these models and addtitional analyses using Bayesian estimation and 555 
frequentist methods are reported in the Supplementary Material pages 14-18. 556 
  
Insert Figure 7 about here 557 
IPSI individuals are expected to take credibly more solutions (median 13, 95% confidence 558 
interval of 7 to 26) to converge on the Door 2 Solution than the Door 1 Solution of Study 2.1 559 
(coefficient of effect of door location= 5.8, 95% confidence interval of 4.3 – 7.8; Model 560 
including Door location (Door 1 or 2) gained 100% of the Akaike weight; Figure 8).  561 
Insert Figure 8 about here 562 
 
Biways and Pitfall: summary 563 
We do not directly compare the number of solutions taken by those with a prior, sub-564 
optimal solution to converge on the optimum solution between the Biways and Pitfall 565 
participants. Although the manipulation of task complexity is our variable of interest, the effect 566 
of a prior solution can only be deduced from analysis that includes naïve individuals faced with 567 
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the same task, rather than comparisons between tasks. In the Biways task, there is greater 568 
overlap in the predicted solutions taken until convergence between naïve and experienced 569 
individuals. There is no predicted overlap between these groups in the Pitfall task. In the 570 
Biways box, naïve chimpanzees (Biways-SN) did not converge on the optimum solution right 571 
away. This indicates that the behaviors seen in Biways-experienced individuals (Biways - IPSI) 572 
were perhaps similar to naive controls, and may not have been the result of perseveration. We 573 
cannot apply this reasoning to the Pitfall behaviors, as the naïve individuals (Pitfall –SN) 574 
immediately converged on the optimum solution and so acted very differently from the 575 
experienced individuals (Pitfall – IPSI), who perseverated. We conclude there is a stronger and 576 
more credible effect of a complex prior solution. 577 
General discussion 578 
     Chimpanzees showed relatively little conservatism when behavior optimization involved 579 
the inhibition of a well-established but simple solution (Study 1.2), or addition of a simple 580 
modification to a well-established but complex solution (Study 2.1). Such changes were 581 
facilitated by viewing a model perform the improved solution (Studies 1.1 and 2.1). In contrast, 582 
when behavioral optimization involved the inhibition of a well-established but complex 583 
solution, chimpanzees showed evidence of conservatism (Study 2.2). This was indicated by two 584 
separate findings: 585 
 586 
I. Chimpanzees with a prior, sub-optimal solution (Pitfall -IPSI) took longer to converge 587 
on the optimum solution than chimpanzees who had no prior solution (Pitfall-SN); and 588 
II. Chimpanzees with a prior, sub-optimal solution (Pitfall-IPSI) quickly optimized their 589 
established behaviors when optimization required the addition of a simple behavior, 590 
lifting a door (Door 1), to their original solution. However, when optimization again 591 
 29 
required the lifting of a door (Door 2), but the inhibition of the established solution, 592 
chimpanzees took longer to optimize their behavior.  593 
Given that Door 1 and Door 2 were nearly identical, these findings cannot be explained by 594 
IPSI chimpanzees not recognizing the affordances of the apparatus, as they quickly converged 595 
on opening Door 1 under the same conditions (with a pay-off incentive and social information). 596 
Nor can results be explained by chimpanzees not knowing how to open Door 2, as the opening 597 
process was the same as for Door 1, and readily discovered by solution-naïve chimpanzees. We 598 
therefore conclude that behavioral conservatism was caused in this case by a failure to inhibit a 599 
well-established solution. Further, given that chimpanzees showed a stronger ability to inhibit 600 
their established solution when that solution was simple in nature (Study 1.2), we further 601 
propose that behavioral conservatism may be context dependent: behavioral conservatism is 602 
not due to an inhibition problem per se, but rather the inhibition of complex behaviors. 603 
Complex behaviors very likely place a higher demand on cognitive processes, such as working 604 
memory, which may limit the resources needed for inhibition (Halford et al., 1998). Thus, in 605 
line with human research, conservatism may be caused by limited cognitive resources. As 606 
reviewed in the introduction, we suggest that variation in task complexity contributes to the 607 
divergent findings within the primate literature on chimpanzees’ behavioral flexibility, and the 608 
results reported above provide direct evidence to support this contention. 609 
Habit formation and chunking 610 
A further alternative hypothesis would be that the original behaviors in both Biways and 611 
Pitfall were so well practiced that they became habitual. In habit formation, complex action 612 
sequences may be ‘chunked’ into a single executable unit. This may reduce cognitive resource 613 
use, as the relationships between actions and outcomes do not have to be held in mind, and are 614 
thus potentially more resilient to outcome-dependent change (see Smith & Graybiel, 2014; 615 
2016 for a review). Building on a chunked solution may not be as difficult as interrupting or 616 
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changing the intrinsic contents of the chunk. In the Pitfall study 2.2, participants would have 617 
had to do just this: stop part-way along a chunked sequence and insert a new behavior, 618 
something they were not required to do in Biways or Pitfall study 2.1. This suggests that 619 
complexity of behavior affects behavioral optimization not because of limited cognitive 620 
resources per se, but rather because mechanisms such as chunking may reduce cognitive 621 
resource use by making complex behavior less computationally demanding. 622 
Although we are not ruling out this alternative, we suggest that the flexible use of 623 
multiple solution variants (Supplementary Material Table S10), as well as predominant use of 624 
only outcome relevant actions, indicates that the participants may not have been behaving in a 625 
merely habitual manner, but were goal-oriented in their behavior. In contrast, the hallmarks of 626 
habitual behavior are invariance, or the use of more “stereotypic and routed movements 627 
through a task environment” (Smith & Greybiel, 2014, pg 4). 628 
Behavioral complexity and cumulative culture 629 
Cultural behaviors, especially with regard to technologies like those of wild 630 
chimpanzees, can be simple, like placing leaves on wet ground as a seat, or show such 631 
complexities as the use of tool sets like power tools to open holes and more delicate probes to 632 
fish within them  (Boesch, Head, & Robbins, 2009; Sanz, Schöning, & Morgan, 2010; Whiten, 633 
2015). Candidate cumulative change in these behaviors typically involves an increase in such 634 
complexity, adding elements to existing routines, as in the unusual fashioning of brush tips on 635 
stems used to fish for subterranean termites once tunnels have been made using stout sticks, by 636 
Goualougo chimpanzees (Sanz, Call and Morgan, 2009). Outside of our own hominin line, 637 
such cumulative complexity appears rare (Tennie et al. 2009). Our findings suggest that this 638 
may be caused in part by difficulties in relinquishing elements, or interrupting the sequence, of 639 
complex routines. Complementary work (Davis et al., 2016) has found that chimpanzees 640 
exhibit yet higher levels of behavioral conservatism when behavioral optimization involves not 641 
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only the partial inhibition of a complex solution (mirroring Study 2.2), but also the addition of a 642 
complex element, as opposed to a simple one. In Davis et al. (2016) chimpanzees initially used 643 
a hard-learned, multi-stepped, inefficient method of extracting rewards from a puzzle box. This 644 
required participants to lift lids and use the underlying finger holes to maneuver a valued token 645 
to an extraction point. To solve the task more efficiently, participants could partially inhibit this 646 
inefficient method, and add a complex element of pulling open a door, using a hard-to-master 647 
pincer movement, at a different extraction point. Most chimpanzees were able to build on their 648 
initial, complex solution only by first mastering the additive door pull as an independent 649 
solution, and then combining this with the elements of their original, complex solution.   650 
Conclusion 651 
Notwithstanding other vital socio-cognitive adaptations, it is important to consider that 652 
whilst chimpanzees may possess some cognitive functions homologous with our own (Beran et 653 
al., 2016), it is very likely that humans have a greater ability to hold on to and manipulate more 654 
information in working memory (Coolidge & Wynn, 2005; Haidle, 2010; Washburn 2016), 655 
whether through quantitative or qualitative changes in cognitive control. Thus, not only can 656 
humans learn more complex sequences of behavior but have more resources available to 657 
facilitate behavioral flexibility (see also Gruber, 2016). However, in keeping with findings within 658 
human developmental literature (e.g. Davidson et al., 2006), chimpanzees appear to also 659 
exhibit perseveration as a result of limited cognitive resources in key executive functions. 660 
Taken together, and in conjunction with previous research reviewed above, our results 661 
suggest that chimpanzees’ conservatism is in part caused by complexities in the behaviors 662 
concerned, both when relinquishing complex behaviors, or adding complex behaviors to 663 
established solutions, and this may be constrained by cognitive resource availability. We suggest 664 
that these behaviors are particularly relevant for cumulative culture, and may partially explain 665 
the relative stasis of chimpanzee culture compared to human culture.  666 
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Compliance with Ethical Standards 667 
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Table 1 
 
Group characteristics  
Group Group ID Participants Increased payoff Social info 
Increased Payoff with 
Social Info 
IPSI 8 Yes Yes 
Same Payoff with Social 
Info 
SI 6 No Yes 
Increased Payoff but no 
Social Info 
IP 5 Yes No 
Note: Participants: Number of individuals in each group meeting criterion for inclusion; 
Increased payoff = Did the pull method result in a higher payoff than the slide handle? Social 
info = Was there social information available about the pull method? 
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Table 2 
 
Behaviors in testing phase 
 
Individual Group 
Increased 
payoff 
Social 
information 
Pull solutions Total solutions 
My IPSI Yes Yes 281 296 
Cea IPSI Yes Yes 81 97 
Ze  IPSI Yes Yes 68 68 
Sa IPSI Yes Yes 134 193 
Je  IPSI Yes Yes 21 29 
Ti  IPSI Yes Yes 25 59 
Hh  IPSI Yes Yes 58 60 
Cr  IPSI Yes Yes 83 207 
Na  SI No Yes 0 298 
Ci SI No Yes 0 87 
Ae  SI No Yes 0 209 
Hg  SI No Yes 0 158 
Chu  SI No Yes 1 155 
Gs  SI No Yes 55 328 
Bn IP Yes No 0 115 
Tk IP Yes No 0 115 
Sy IP Yes No 0 115 
Bte IP Yes No 0 115 
Pr IP Yes No 0 115 
 
Note: From left to right: Individual: Initials of participant; Group: IPSI = increased payoff with 
social information, SI = same payoff with social information, IP = increased payoff with no 
social information; Increased payoff: Did the pull solution result in an increased payoff? Social 
information: Was social information about the alternative pull solution available? Pull 
solutions: total number of pull solutions. Total solutions: all solutions used, including pull, 
slide and both 
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Table 3 
 
Coefficients of the model parameters for effect of payoff and social information 
Parameters Mean StdDev Lower 0.95 Upper 0.95 
Average intercept -10.40 5.63 -21.55 0.38 
bip -3.15 5.59 -14.06 7.83 
bsi  3.98 5.62 -6.68 15.18 
bipsi  11.3 5.64  0.06 22.39 
Note: Mean is the mean predicted value of the coefficient. StdDev is the standard deviation. 
Lower 0.95 and upper 0.95 are the 95% credible interval boundaries for the coefficient values. 
 
 46 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Solution variants during Study 2.1 testing  
 
Individual 
No Door 
Solution 
           Block 
Sequence  Pre-empt 
Door 1 
Solution 
            Block 
Sequence   Pre-empt 
             Door 1 
Sequence   Pre-empt 
 Food order 
Small    Large 
My 0 0 0 102 81 21 85 17 86 15 
Cea 0 0 0 35 29 6 34 1 31 4 
Al 23 19 4 94 90 4 93 1 20 71 
Na 17 2 15 78 47 31 73 5 61 9 
Ci 7 6 1 23 20 3 21 2 22 1 
Ae 1 0 1 53 48 5 53 0 27 26 
Sa 6 6 0 32 29 3 29 3 28 3 
Gs 1 1 0 54 42 12 49 5 44 8 
Hh 0 0 0 63 43 20 62 1 28 35 
Cr 1 0 1 78 74 4 76 2 67 4 
Note: Table cells are shaded (pink) for data relating to the No Door Solution. From left to right: Individual: Initials of participants; No Door 
Solution: Number of times the participant used the No Door Solution; Block – Sequence: number of times the block defense was pushed out 
only once the foodbox arrived at the block’s location when using the No Door Solution; Block – Pre-empt: the number of times the block 
defense was pre-emptively removed before the foodbox arrived at the block’s location; Door 1 solution: Number of times the participant used 
the Door 1 solution; Block – Sequence: number of times the block defense was pushed out only once the foodbox arrived at the block’s 
location when using the Door 1 Solution; Block – Pre-empt: the number of times the block defense was removed pre-emptively; Door 1 – 
Sequence: the number of times Door 1 was opened only when the foodbox arrived at Door 1’s location; Door 1 – Pre-empt: the number of 
times Door 1 was pre-emptively opened before the foodbox arrived at Door 1’s location. Food order – Small: the number of times the small 
reward was removed from the foodbox before the large reward; Food order – Large: the number of times the large reward was removed from 
the foodbox before the small reward. 
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Figure 1. The Biways Box. The top handle can be slid in the direction of the arrow to knock a 
peanut off the shelf. The bottom handle, when not locked shut, can be pulled outwards to 
release the peanut plus 3 grapes. The reward is delivered below the handles, where the 
participant can reach in and remove it. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of pull responses for individuals in the IP, SI and IPSI groups, with N 1 
number of participants shown for each group. The line is the mean of the predicted proportion 2 
of pull responses, with the shaded area showing 95% confidence intervals. The grey circles 3 
(plotted points) are the proportion of pulls for each participant based on the condition they 4 
experienced. Plotted points have been ‘jittered’ around the proportion value of zero for 5 
illustrative purposes. 6 
 
 
49 
 
 
Figure 3.  The Foodbox consists of two shelves with reward on each of these shelves. The 
foodbox sits within the Pitfall box  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
Figure 4.  The No Door Solution. With the removal of the defence block, the foodbox can be 
ferried (via the access strip) to the end of the apparatus. The small food reward can then be 
extracted at the end via a hole cut into the apparatus (End position 1). No doors can be 
opened, and the large reward remains inaccessible. 
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Figure 5.  Door 1 Solution. With the removal of the defence block, the foodbox can be ferried 
(via the access strip) to the end of the apparatus. The small food reward can then be extracted 
at the end via a hole cut into the apparatus (End position 1), and/or additionally, now Door 1 
can be opened, and all the reward extracted (End position 2). 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
Figure 6.  Door 2 Solution. With Door 2 now unlocked, the foodbox need only be moved to 
the location of Door 2, and the Door opened allowing extraction of all rewards (End position 
3). Alternatively, with the removal of the defence block, the foodbox can be ferried (via the 
access strip) to the end of the apparatus. The small food reward can then be extracted at the 
end via a hole cut into the apparatus. However, now that the pit is open, the large reward is lost 
as it is moved to the end of the apparatus (End position 4). 
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Figure 7.  Model predictions for convergence on the optimum Door 2 solution for naïve (SN) 
and experienced (IPSI) participants. For Naïve individuals, plotted points have been ‘jittered’ 
around the value of one for illustrative purposes. The line represents the mean effect of prior 
solution between the expected number of solutions till convergence on the optimum solution 
between naïve and experienced individuals, the dark grey area is the 95% confidence limit for 
this effect. The light grey area is where 95% of the population are predicted to fall. 
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Figure 8.  Model predictions for solution taken till convergence on Door 1 and 2 for IPSI 
individuals. Grey plotted points connected by thin (pink) lines represents the actual observed 
solution number on which an IPSI individual converged on Door 1 and 2 respectively. The 
grey line represents the mean effect of door location between the expected number of solutions 
till convergence on Door 1 (which does not require inhibition) and Door 2 (which requires 
inhibition) Solutions. The dark grey area is the 95% confidence limit for this effect. The light 
grey area is where 95% of the population are predicted to fall. 
